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In November 1984, Richard Stephen-
son was murdered in East St. Louis, Illi-
nois. There were no suspects in the 
homicide until March 1986, when Don-
ald Charlton, an inmate of the Graham 
Correctional Facility, informed the po-
lice that he had pertinent information 
regarding the crime. A fellow inmate of 
Charlton's, Uoyd Perkins, had told him 
the details of a murder he committed in 
East St. Louis. 
Acting on Charlton's detailed account, 
which the police found to be credible, 
police traced Perkins to a jail in Mont-
gomery County, Illinois, where he was 
awaiting trial on an unrelated charge. In 
order to further investigate Perkins' re-
lation to the murder, police placed 
undercover agent,John Parisi, and Charl-
ton in a cellblock with Perkins. The two 
men were instructed to engage Perkins 
in casual conversation and report any 
reference made to the Stephenson 
murder. Parisi and Charlton gained Per-
kins' confidence by promising a fabri-
cated escape plot. In that murder could 
have been necessary to effectuate such a 
plot, Parisi inquired whether Perkins 
had ever murdered anyone before. Per-
kins responded by relaying the details of 
how he murdered Stephenson. At no 
time was Perkins given Miranda warn-
ings, and Perkins was subsequently 
charged with the Stephenson murder. 
At trial, Perkins moved to suppress his 
statements made to Parisi while in jail. 
The trial court granted the motion; the 
State appealed. In affirming, the appel-
late court held that Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966), "prohibits all 
undercover contacts with incarcerated 
suspects which are reasonably likely to 
elicit an incriminating response." Per-
kins, 110 S. Ct. at 2396. The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to determine 
whether Miranda warnings must be 
given under such circumstances, and 
reversed. 
In an opinion delivered by Justice 
Kennedy, the Supreme Court first cited 
the fifth amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination, which prohibits the 
admission into evidence of statements 
made during custodial interrogation, 
absent Miranda warnings. Custodial 
interrogation involves the questioning 
of a suspect in a coercive, police-
dominated atmosphere. [d. at 2397. The 
Court found that the doctrine was in-
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tended to safeguard suspects from the 
"inherently compelling pressures which 
work to undermine the individual's will 
to resist and to compel him to speak 
where he would not otherwise do so 
freely." [d. (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. 
at 467). 
The Court, however, distinguished 
Perkins from the concerns underlying 
Miranda. The problem of compulsion 
inherent in a police-dominated atmo-
sphere, the Court reasoned, is not pres-
ent when an incarcerated suspect speaks 
voluntarily to an undercover 
agent. "Coercion is determined from 
the perspective of the suspect." [d. (ci-
tations omitted). Thus, the coercive 
atmosphere is absent where a suspect 
speaks voluntarily to a fellow inmate, 
unaware that the inmate is a police 
officer. [d. 
Moreover, the Court rejected the state 
court's assumption that whenever a sus-
pect is in technical custody, Miranda 
warnings must precede any conversa-
tion with an undercover agent. [d. The 
Court reasoned that a suspect, unaware 
that he is speaking with an undercover 
agent, is neither motivated by pressure 
nor the reaction he expects from his 
listener. [d. at 2398. Miranda, the Court 
stated, was not intended to protect state-
ments motivated entirely by a suspect's 
desire to impress other inmates. When 
inmates boast to fellow inmates of their 
crimes, they do so at their own risk. Only 
when a suspect is under coercive pres-
sure to do so, must Miranda warnings 
be given. [d. 
In addressing the ploy used to elicit 
Perkins' statements, the Court found 
that" strategic deception" did not rise to 
the level of coercion and, was therefore 
not violative of the Self-Incrimination 
Clause. [d. (citations omitted). Relying 
_ primarily on HOffa v. United States, 385 
U.S. 293 ( 1966), the Court reiterated its 
approval of the use of deceptive tactics. 
Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2398. In Hoffa, 
incriminating statements made by the 
petitioner to a police informant who 
fooled him into believing that he was a 
colleague, were held admissible, in that 
they did not result from coercion. The 
only factual distinction between the 
cases, the Court noted, was that Perkins 
was incarcerated, a fact the Court con-
sidered irrelevant. [d. 
In addition, the Court distinguished 
ated suspect made incriminating state-
ments to an Internal Revenue Service 
agent absent Miranda warnings. [d. In 
Matbis, the suspect's statements were 
found to be inadmissible. However, in 
Matbis, the Court noted, the suspect 
was fully aware that the agent was a 
government official and was therefore 
susceptible to coercive pressure to 
answer questions. Perkins, on the other 
hand, was unaware of the undercover 
agent's official status. [d. 
Finally, the Court rejected the re-
spondent's argument that a bright-line 
rule for applying Miranda was desirable. 
[d. at 2389. The Court reasoned that law 
enforcement officials would have no 
problem implementing the holding that 
undercover agents need not Mirandize 
incarcerated suspects. [d. The holding 
clearly stated that Miranda concerns 
were not present in such cases, and 
therefore, Miranda warnings were not 
required under such circumstances. 
Finding no Miranda concerns impli-
cated when an undercover agent speaks 
with an incarcerated suspect, the Court 
held that Miranda warnings need not be 
given. The Court found arguments 
against the use of such deceptive tech-
niques and in favor of Miranda warnings 
in all custodial situations to be unper-
suasive. Thus, the use of undercover 
agents to elicit incriminating in-
formation from suspects was ruled to be 
a valid law-enforcement technique. 
- Tena Touzos 
Cruzan v. Missouri Department of 
Health: MISSOURI MAY REQUIRE 
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVI-
DENCE OF A PATIENT'S WISHES 
TO DISCONTINUE FOOD AND 
WATER 
In Cruzan v. MissouriDep'tofHealtb, 
110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990), the Supreme 
Court held that a state may apply a clear 
and convincing evidence standard in 
proceedings where a guardian seeks to 
discontinue nutrition and hydration of a 
person in a persistent vegetative state. 
Thus, unless the patient expressed his 
wishes sufficiently to meet 
this standard before incompetency, he 
would remain in a vegetative state indef-
initely, regardless of the objections and 
wishes of family members. 
Nancy Cruzan was rendered incom-
petent by injuries sustained in an auto-
mobile accident. After the accident she 
remained in a Missouri state hospital in a 
persistent vegetative state, where the 
State of Missouri bore the cost of her 
care. Nancy's parents sought a court 
order for the withdrawal of their daugh-
ter's artificial feeding and hydration 
equipment, as it was apparent that she 
had virtually no chance of recovering. 
The trial court found that an incompe-
tent person had the right to refuse 
"death-prolonging procedures," but the 
Court did not adopt the clear and con-
vincing evidence standard. Id. at 2846. 
Thus, the Court issued the order based 
on a conversation between Nancy and 
her housemate in which Nancy stated 
that if sick or injured she would not wish 
to continue her life unless she could live 
at least halfway normally. Id 
The Supreme Court of Missouri re-
versed and held that because no clear 
and convincing evidence existed as to 
Nancy's intentions specifically regard-
ing refusal offood and fluids, her parents 
could not refuse the treatment for her. 
Id. It also decided that the Missouri Liv-
ingWiU statute, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 459.010 
et. seq. ( 1986), embodied a state policy 
strongly favoring the preservation of life. 
Id. The U.S. Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to decide whether Nancy had a 
constitutional right to require the hos-
pital to withdraw her treatment under 
these circumstances. 
The Court began by recognizing a 
person's right to refuse treatment based 
on the common law doctrine of in-
formed consent. It stated that the dis-
pensing of medical treatment first re-
quired a patient's informed consent em-
bodied in the notion of bodily integrity. 
Id. at 2846-47. The right to privacy, 
which was the foundation of a similar 
case, In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, 38-42 
355 A.2d 647 (1976), was also exam-
ined as a basis for terminating treatment. 
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2847. 
In Quinlan, the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey granted the parents' request 
to disconnect their incompetent daugh-
ter's respirator based on the daughter's 
constitutional right to privacy. The court 
concluded that the only practical way to 
preserve the incompetent patient's pri-
vacy right was to allow her family to 
decide whether she would exercise it in 
these circumstances. The U.S. Supreme 
Court, however, pointed out that after 
Quinlan, most courts based a patient's 
right to refuse treatment either solely on 
the common law right to informed con· 
sent or on both the common law right 
and the right to privacy. Id. 
The Cruzan Court also inferred from 
its prior decisions that a competent per-
son has a constitutionally protected lib-
erty interest in refusing unwanted med-
ical treatment. It previously held in 
Washington v. Harper, that "[t]he forci-
ble injection of medication into a non-
consenting person's body represent [ ed 1 
a substantial interference with that per-
son's liberty," Cruzan 110 S. Ct. at 2851 
(quoting Washington 110 S. Ct. 1028, 
1033 (1990». The Court state that deter-
mining that a person has a Due Process 
"liberty interest" did not end the inquiry, 
but that the liberty interest must be bal-
anced against the relevant state inter-
ests.ld. (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 
457 u.s. 307, 321 (1982». 
The Court assumed for the purposes 
of this case that the Constitution grants a 
competent person the right to refuse 
lifesaving hydration and nutrition. Based 
upon this assumption, the Court ad-
dressed the Cruzan's claim that an in-
competent person possesses the same 
right. The Court noted, however, that an 
incompetent person cannot make an 
informed and voluntary choice without 
the help of some sort of"surrogate." Id. 
at 2852. 
The Court acknowledged Missouri's 
reCOgnition of a surrogate to act for the 
patient in electing to have life-sustaining 
treatment withdrawn. It focused, how-
ever, on Missouri's establishment of the 
procedural safeguard requiring proof by 
clear and convincing evidence to assure 
that the action of the surrogate con· 
formed to the wishes expressed by the 
patient while competent.ld. Thus, the 
Court determined that the issue was 
whether the United States Constitution 
forbade the establishment of such a 
requirement. Based upon the interest 
the state sought to protect, the Court 
found that the required heightened pro-
cedural standard was valid. Id. 
Missouri's interest was the protection 
and preservation of human life. The 
Court supported this interest by recog· 
nizing that states treat homicide as a 
serious crime, and most impose crimi-
nal penalties for assisting with suicide. 
Id. Missouri also properly sought to 
secure the deeply personal nature of 
choosing between life and death. Id. at 
2842-53. The Court cautioned, how-
ever, that not all incompetents will have 
available surrogates, and where family 
members are present, some will not act 
to protect the patient.ld. at 2853. The 
Court thus allowed Missouri to advance 
these interests through the adoption of 
the heightened evidentiary requirement. 
Id In addition, the Court asserted that a 
state may decline to make judgments 
about the quality of an individual's life 
and simply assert an unqualified interest 
in the preservation of life to be weighed 
against the constitutionally protected 
interests of the individual.ld. 
The Court determined that Missouri 
correctly sought to advance these inter-
ests through the adoption of a clear and 
convincing standard of proof in this 
situation. It noted that the greater the 
consequences of an erroneous decision, 
the more stringent the burden of proof 
should be. Id at 2854. The Court thus 
held that Missouri properly placed that 
increased burden on those seeking to 
terminate an incompetent's life-sustain-
ing treatment in that the decision to 
withdraw treatment is irreversible. 
After finding that the Missouri Su-
preme Court had properly concluded 
that the evidence at trial did not meet 
the required standard of proof, the Court 
ruled that the Due Process Clause did 
not require a state to accept the" substi-
tuted judgment" of close fami1ymembers 
in its absence. Id. at 2855-56. Based 
upon the same reasons that it may 
require a heightened procedural stan-
dard, a state may choose to defer to a 
patient's wishes rather than confide the 
decision to close family members.ld. at 
2856. 
Justice O'Connor concurred that a 
person has a liberty interest in refusing 
artificially delivered food and water. She 
was concerned, however, in that the 
majority's decision does not preclude a 
future determination that the Constitu-
tion requires the states to accept the 
decisions of a patient's duly-appointed 
surrogate. She stated that such accep-
tance may be required because of its 
practicality and the desire to honor a 
patient's intent.ld. at 2857 (O'Connor, 
J., concurring). She concluded that the 
procedures for safeguarding incompe-
tents' liberty interests are entrusted to 
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the "laboratory" of the states. Id. at 2859 
(O'Connor, J., concurring). 
Justice Scalia also concurred with the 
Court's analysis but preferred that the 
decision pronounce that the federal 
courts have no business in this field. Id. 
(Scalia, J., concurring). He noted that 
American Law has always accorded the 
state power to prevent suicide. He added 
that the cause of death in suicide and 
starvation is the suicidal person's con-
scious decision to "pu[t] an end to his 
own existence." Id. at 2860 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (quoting 4 W. Blackstone, 
Commentaries 189). 
In a vigorous and lengthy dissent, Jus-
tice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall 
and Justice Blackmun, opined that the 
majority's opinion failed to respect the 
best interests of the patients. He stated 
that "the right to be free from unwanted 
medical treatment [was] categorically 
limited to those patients who had the 
foresight to make an unambiguous state-
ment of their wishes while competent." 
Id. at 2879 (Brennan,]., dissenting). 
Justice Stevens, dissenting, questioned 
the majority's definition of "life" by sug-
gesting that, for patients like Nancy, 
there is a serious question as to whether 
the mere persistence of their bodies is 
"life." Id. at 2892 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). He emphasized that "[t]he mean-
ing and completion of her life should be 
controlled by persons who have her best 
interests at heart - not by a state legisla-
ture concerned only with the 'preserva-
tion oflife.'" Id. (Stevens,]., dissenting). 
The Supreme Court recognized that a 
"right to die" exists by virtue of the Due 
Process Clause and mandated that it be 
respected in states that have such legis-
lation. Missouri properly chose to limit 
this right by requiring clear and con-
vincing evidence of the patient's wishes. 
Other limits on the right to die are left to 
the states to define in their own "labora-
tories." It would appear that the confu-
sion over the right to die has just begun. 
- Lesley A. Davis 
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Peel v. Illinois: THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT'S COMMERCIAL 
SPEECH STANDARDS ALLOW 
AN ATTORNEY TO ADVERTISE 
HIS CERTIFICATION 
In Peel v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 2281 
( 1990), the United States Supreme Court 
held that an attorney had a constitution-
ally protected right, under the first 
amendment's commercial speech stan-
dards, to advertise his certification as a 
trial specialist. States are, thereby, pro-
hibited from completely banning these 
advertisements but may use less restric-
tive measures to regulate them. 
In 1987, the Attorney Registration 
and Disciplinary Commission of Illinois 
("Commission") rued a complaint alleg-
ing that Gary Peel held himself out as a 
certified legal specialist in violation of 
the Illinois Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility. Peel, 110 S. Ct. at 2285. 
Rule 2-105(a)(3) of the Illinois Code 
of Professional Responsibility provides 
that" a lawyer or law firm may specify or 
designate any area or field of law in 
which he or its partners concentrates or 
limits his or its practice ... no lawyer may 
hold himself out as 'certified' or a 'spe-
cialist.''' Id. at 2286. Peel's professional 
letterhead included the notation "Certi-
fied Civil Trial Specialist by the National 
Board of Trial Advocacy" ("NBTA"), fol-
lowed by the words "Licensed: Illinois, 
Missouri, Arizona." Id. at 2285. 
The Illinois Supreme Court held that 
the letterhead was misleading in three 
ways. First, on the letterhead, the certi-
fication was listed prior to the licensure, 
and the court found that the public 
could mistakenly construe that Peel's 
authority to practice trial advocacy came 
from the NBTA, thereby" impinging on 
the exclusive authority" of the courts to 
license attorneys. Id. at 2286. Second, 
the NBTA certification implied that 
Peel's legal services as a trial advocate 
were superior to other attorneys' serv-
ices, and thirdly, that NBT A certification 
was a product of state licensure. Id. at 
2287. Therefore, the Illinois Supreme 
Court followed the Commission's recom-
mendation and censured Peel. Id at 
2286. 
The Supreme Court found that NBTA 
was a well recognized organization re-
quiring exacting standards for certifica-
tion. These standards included jury and 
non-jury trial experience as lead coun-
sel, successful completion of a day-long 
examination, continuing legal education 
requirements, and demonstrated writ-
ingability.Id. at 2284-85. The Court also 
found that certification must be renewed 
every five years and that several states, 
including Minnesota and Alabama, rec-
ognized NBTA certification. Id 
The Court next examined which stan-
dards should be used in determining 
whether the State could regulate this 
type of advertisement. The Supreme 
Court agreed with the state court that 
the standards for commercial speech 
under the first amendment applied be-
cause Peel's letterhead was a "form of 
commercial speech governed by the 
'constitutional limitations on the regula-
tion oflawyer advertising.'" Id. at 2287 
(quoting In re Peel, 126 Ill.2d 397, 402, 
534 N.E.2d 980, 982). 
In the case ofInreR.M], 455 U.S. 191 
(1982), the Court summarized these 
standards as: 
Truthful advertising related to law-
ful activities is entitled to the pro-
tections of the First Amendment. 
But when the particular content 
or method of advertising suggests 
that it is inherently misleading or 
when experience has proved that 
in fact such advertising is subject 
to abuse, the States may impose 
appropriate restrictions. 
Peel, 110 S. Ct. at 2287. However, the 
Court in In re R.M] also held that the 
states may not place an absolute prohi-
bition on certain types of potentially 
misleading information. Id. (citing In re 
R.M], 455 U.S. at 203.) 
The Court then evaluated whether 
the letterhead was misleading and 
whether state censorship was justified. 
The Court assumed that some con-
sumers might infer from the sequential 
listing of the certification that it ex-
ceeded the qualifications for admission 
to a state bar. Id. at 2288. However, 
since the NBTA's requirements were 
verifiable factually, and not statements 
of quality or opinion, they were not mis-
leading. Id. In addition, the Court 
emphasized that NBTA's certification 
was like a trademark, in that, the quality 
of the certification was recognized be-
cause of the organization granting it. Id. 
The state court had argued that the 
statements were misleading because con-
sumers might identify the certification 
as being issued by the state. The Supreme 
